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What Do Economists Say? What Do CFOs Say?
Any homeowner who has shopped 
around for a mortgage would recognize 
many of the concerns facing the chief 
financial officer (CFo) puzzling over 
her firm’s optimal debt maturity.  A 
CFo may ask, “Should my firm sell a 
long-term bond and lock in the current 
30-year rate, or should my firm sell a 
five-year note and refinance in five 
years?” one of the CFo’s concerns 
is that the five-year loan may subject 
ike households, firms that borrow money 
to finance operations must make decisions 
about the optimal maturity of their debt. 
Should a firm take a short-term loan now 
and refinance later? or is the firm better off locking in 
a long-term interest rate now?  In this article, Mitchell 
berlin discusses recent theories of how firms choose their 
debt maturity. Some of these theories are very useful for 
explaining how chief financial officers (CFos) choose 
the maturity of their firms’ debt. however, CFos seem 
to believe that they can predict future interest rates and 
time their borrowings accordingly, and this behavior 
fundamentally conflicts with most economic theories.
her firm to the risk of refinancing at 
an inopportune time, for example, 
when the bond market is skittish and 
risk premiums are high, or following a 
string of negative earnings reports.
there is now substantial evidence 
that many CFos also ask themselves, 
“Do I think that long-term rates are 
going to fall soon?  If so, maybe we 
should take out a short-term loan 
now and refinance at a lower rate five 
months from now.” While this reason-
ing may seem sound to some readers, 
economic models of the relationship 
between short-term rates and long-
term rates say that the CFo is wasting 
his or her time hoping to lower the 
firm’s borrowing costs in this way, as 
I’ll discuss later.   
Some leading theories of firms’ 
choice of debt maturity are based on 
the idea that firms are better informed 
about their own creditworthiness than 
are lenders, another consideration that 
may be familiar to household bor-
rowers. For example, a CFo of a firm 
with a promising, but untested, new 
product may reason that by borrow-
ing short-term and reentering debt 
markets next year, the firm can lower 
borrowing costs because lenders are 
likely to raise their projections of firm 
profitability once initial sales figures 
come in. Another leading theory says 
that short-term debt tends to mitigate 
the conflicting interests of a firm’s 
stockholders and its bondholders about 
the firm’s choice of investments.
empirical studies of firms’ debt 
maturity choices suggest that finance 
theorists have made significant 
progress in explaining these matters; 
at the same time, these empirical stud-
ies have uncovered a few interesting 
puzzles. Sophisticated borrowers’ belief 
that they can lower their funding costs 
by timing the maturity of their borrow-
ings based on their forecasts of interest 
rate movements is one of these puzzles.
PRIVATE INFORMATION MAY 
AFFECT DEBT MATURITY
Short-Term Loans Make Fund-
ing Costs More Sensitive to New 
Public Information About Firms.  
In an influential model by Douglas 
Diamond, a firm’s insiders (its man-
agers and large stockholders) have 
information about the firm’s likelihood 
of default that is superior to that of 
outsiders, in this case, its creditors. 
that is, insiders have what economists 
call private information. this is not 
to say that creditors are completely 
uninformed about the firm. they may 
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have a number of observable indicators 
of the firm’s credit risk, for example, 
a credit rating from Moody’s.  how-
ever, the firm’s managers will often 
have better information than creditors 
about the firm’s prospects because of 
managers’ involvement in the run-
ning of the firm.  this means that 
two firms that both have b+ ratings 
from Moody’s may actually have quite 
different probabilities of defaulting on 
their debts. this is a problem not only 
for creditors but also for the firm that 
is truly more creditworthy than other, 
similarly rated firms. Unless the lower 
risk firm can find some way to signal 
its private information to its lenders, it 
will end up borrowing at the same high 
rate as all the other b+ firms because 
creditors will be unable to tell them 
apart.
Diamond argues that one possible 
way for the low-risk firm to lower its 
borrowing costs is to shorten its debt 
maturity.  Matters known only to man-
agement today will gradually become 
more public in the course of time; for 
example, a firm that has a low risk 
of default is more likely to generate a 
good quarterly earnings report in the 
future than a higher risk firm. When 
lenders see a new earnings report, 
they update their beliefs about a firm’s 
credit risk, and the firm will be able to 
borrow at a lower rate than previously. 
So a manager with private informa-
tion that his firm is more creditworthy 
reasons: “With short-term loans we 
can make our borrowing costs more 
sensitive to public information as it 
becomes available to lenders. Since 
our earnings report is likely to contain 
good news about our future prospects, 
our cost of funds is likely to fall.” 1
But Refinancing Short-Term 
Debt Creates Liquidity Risk.  If the 
future were perfectly predictable, this 
would be the end of the story.  A man-
ager with private information that his 
firm is low risk would always choose 
the shortest possible maturity. how-
ever, even firms with low default risk 
may temporarily suffer low profits and 
find themselves trying to refinance 
their debt at an inopportune time. 
this might simply lead to higher inter-
est costs for a time, or it might force 
the firm to cut back business or forgo 
profitable investments. this is called 
liquidity risk.  Liquidity risk limits even 
a low-risk firm’s appetite for shortening 
the maturity of its debt. While low-risk 
firms will take account of liquidity risk, 
high-risk firms will take it even more 
seriously because they have a higher 
likelihood of reporting low profits and 
facing higher borrowing costs.
there is empirical evidence that 
liquidity risk is a real concern for firms 
and that it affects their choice of debt 
maturity. CFos responding to John 
Graham and Campbell harvey’s exten-
sive survey of 392 financial executives 
cite the “cost of refinancing in bad 
times” as the second most important 
factor affecting their debt maturity 
choice.
The Firm’s Optimal Debt 
Maturity Depends on Observable 
Measures of Credit Risk. Consider 
two firms, one of which creditors view 
as riskier than the other based on 
observable indicators of credit risk. 
Although in the real world the infor-
mation available to creditors is a lot 
broader than the credit rating alone, 
I’ll use the shorthand term credit rating 
to summarize these observables. In 
Diamond’s model, firms with a higher 
credit rating are more likely to report 
strong earnings in the future than 
those with a lower credit rating.  that 
is, at higher credit ratings it is more 
likely that the manager of a firm has 
private information that the firm is 
low risk.  this means that firms with 
higher credit ratings face less liquidity 
risk, and thus, Diamond predicts firms 
with higher credit ratings will use more 
short-term debt than firms with lower 
credit ratings.
Actually, there is a twist.  For 
some very risky firms, lenders are 
simply unwilling to lend long term 
because lenders will lose money too 
often if they are unable to raise their 
rate or will refuse to provide further 
funding based on the most current 
information. As a result, lenders will 
provide only very short-term financing 
for such firms to keep them on a short 
leash.2 So Diamond predicts that both 
very low-risk and very high-risk firms 
will use short-term debt.
Even firms with low default risk may 
temporarily suffer low profits and find 
themselves trying to refinance their debt at an 
inopportune time. 
1 high-risk firms would prefer to make their bor-
rowing costs less sensitive to public information 
by locking in today’s rate. but in Diamond’s 
model, they are forced to mimic the low-risk 
firms and borrow short-term funds or else be 
revealed as high-risk firms. economists call this 
type of equilibrium a pooling equilibrium. Mark 
Flannery’s paper also highlights private informa-
tion and low-risk firms’ desire to make funding 
costs more sensitive to public information as it 
arrives.  In his paper, the countervailing cost 
of short-term debt is that underwriters must be 
paid each time firms sell a new debt issue. he 
presents a separating equilibrium in which man-
agers with private information that their firm is 
high risk do not mimic the managers of low-risk 
firms; low-risk firms issue short-term debt and 
high-risk firms issue long-term debt.
2 Lenders use a number of other contractual 
devices for such borrowers, especially collateral 
and detailed loan covenants.  Business Review  Q1  2006   5 www.philadelphiafed.org
The Empirical Evidence for the 
Signaling/Liquidity Risk Tradeoff. 
Studies of large firms with access to 
public securities markets uniformly 
support Diamond’s predictions.3 re-
searchers have found that a firm’s debt 
maturity increases as its credit rating 
falls, at least until its credit rating 
becomes speculative (bb or lower).4 
they also find that firms without 
a credit rating typically use more 
short-term debt.  there are two ways 
to think about the absence of a credit 
rating. no credit rating usually means 
that there is little public information 
about a firm — which investors view 
as a source of risk in itself — or it may 
mean that a firm is smaller and riskier 
than the typical firm with public rat-
ings.
Studies of small firms, which 
have more limited access to financial 
markets than large firms, provide 
less consistent support for Diamond’s 
model. these firms typically borrow 
from banks or from finance companies 
rather than by selling bonds to the 
public.  there are difficulties testing 
Diamond’s predictions for firms with-
out credit ratings because researchers 
often can’t observe what information is 
actually available to lenders.
Allen berger, Marco espinosa-
Vega, W. Scott Frame, and nathan 
Miller take the interesting approach 
of using the internal risk ratings that 
banks assign their loan customers as 
a summary measure of the informa-
tion available to a firm’s lender and 
find that debt maturity is longer for 
riskier loans, as Diamond predicts for 
firms with low and moderate credit 
risk. however, there is no switch in the 
relationship for the riskiest borrowers. 
one possible explanation for this find-
ing is that bank loan contracts to the 
riskiest borrowers are likely to include 
very close monitoring by the lender; 
thus, the relationship between credit 
risk and maturity may be more compli-
cated than in Diamond’s model.5  this 
monitoring includes the extensive use 
of covenants that require the borrower 
to prove its financial health to avoid 
default; longer-term debt with exten-
sive covenants may be viewed as a 
relatively close substitute for short-term 
debt.  In itself, the availability of such a 
substitute may confound the relation-
ship between credit risk and maturity 
in the Diamond framework.
STOCKHOLDER/BONDHOLDER 
CONFLICTS MAY AFFECT DEBT 
MATURITY 
When Firms Have Too Much 
Long-Term Debt, Managers May 
Forgo Profitable Investments.  An-
other classic article by Stewart Myers 
begins by making the crucial distinc-
tion between investments already in 
place and growth opportunities, options 
to make an investment sometime in 
the future. the key to Myers’s theory is 
that the way in which the investments 
in place have been financed — in 
particular, whether with debt or with 
equity, and if debt, whether with short-
or long-term debt — affects the profits 
stockholders make from exercising 
growth options.
to see the issues, begin with the 
simple case where the growth oppor-
tunity is profitable on a stand-alone 
basis — that is, the project has positive 
net present value — and the firm has 
no existing debt.  In this case, exist-
ing stockholders would evaluate the 
growth opportunity separately from 
the investment in place and would sup-
port exercising the growth opportunity 
because it is profitable.6  but if the firm 
has debt outstanding, stockholders will 
have to share future profits with the 
bondholders who provided the funds 
to finance the investment in place. 
When the outstanding debt is large 
enough to affect a firm’s investment 
decisions, it is often referred to as the 
debt overhang. If the debt overhang is 
large, the bondholders will capture a 
relatively large share of the projected 
revenues from the new profits, and the 
firm might forgo the profitable growth 
opportunity. this is known as the 
underinvestment problem. 
to see how this can happen, con-
sider a firm that owns a fleet of carts 
that sell roasted chestnuts in Central 
Park. the firm is considering whether 
to purchase a second fleet of ice cream 
stands. the chestnut carts are profit-
able only in cold weather, while the ice 
Researchers have 
found that a firm’s 
debt maturity 
increases as its credit 
rating falls, at least 
until its credit rating 
becomes speculative 
(BB or lower).
3 Articles that provide empirical support for 
Diamond’s model for larger firms include the 
ones by Michael barclay and Clifford Smith; 
Mark Stohs and David Mauer; Shane Johnson; 
and Michael Faulkender and Mitchell Petersen.
4 bonds are rated according to their default 
risk by ratings agencies, the most prominent of 
which are Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.
5 berger and co-authors also find evidence that 
supports the empirical significance of private 
information for the debt maturity of bank loans. 
Specifically, they show that the relationship 
between the bank’s rating and the firm’s matu-
rity is weaker for loans in which the bank used 
credit scoring as part of the loan underwriting 
process. the authors argue (plausibly) that 
information asymmetries are less significant for 
such loans.
6 Myers assumes that managers faithfully carry 
out the interests of the firm’s existing stockhold-
ers. other prominent models in finance empha-
size the conflict between managers’ interests 
and those of the firm’s stockholders. 6   Q1  2006 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
cream stands are profitable only when 
the sun is shining. Forecasters are 
predicting an early spring and a long 
summer, which means that the chest-
nut carts are likely to be unprofitable, 
and the firm may even have to default 
on its debt if it doesn’t diversify into ice 
cream sales. 
how will the firm’s managers 
reason?  According to Myers, they 
may argue: “Most of the profits from 
the new ice cream stands are going 
to go to pay off the old debt used to 
finance the chestnut carts, rather than 
to the firm’s stockholders. the profits 
received by current stockholders are 
much lower than the profits that would 
be generated by the ice cream stands 
alone. Since we are concerned about 
our existing stockholders, we shouldn’t 
make the investment, even though it 
would be profitable.”7
While stockholders might support 
this decision in the short run, in the 
long run, they would actually prefer 
that the firm find a way to avoid 
underinvestment. to see this, think 
about a firm that systematically says no 
to profitable new investments; such a 
firm would suffer from an endemically 
low stock price because its profits will 
be low. So stockholders—especially the 
stockholders of firms with significant 
growth opportunities—would support 
policies to induce managers not to pass 
up profitable investments.
 Firms with large growth opportu-
nities can reduce the underinvestment 
problem in two ways.  First, they can 
borrow less to begin with. the less 
debt a firm has, the lower the possibil-
ity that creditors’ and stockholders’ 
interests will conflict in a material way.   
(Microsoft is an example of a firm with 
no debt outstanding.)  Second, for any 
given amount of debt, the firm can use 
primarily short-term debt, specifically 
debt that matures before its existing 
investments. For example, a firm that 
uses three-month bank loans or com-
mercial paper that matures in three 
months can’t shift risks to its creditors 
because the creditors can insist on a 
new interest rate in line with current 
risks every three months. 
The Evidence for a Relation-
ship Between Underinvestment and 
Debt Maturity. one of the predictions 
of Myers’s model mirrors a standard 
practitioner’s rule of thumb: A firm 
should try to match the maturity of 
its assets and liabilities.  Indeed, for 
Graham and harvey’s CFos, match-
ing assets and liabilities is the most 
commonly cited factor determining 
debt maturity. In all empirical studies 
of firms’ choices of debt maturity, firms 
with longer-lived assets have longer-
term debt.  While there is significant 
empirical evidence for maturity match-
ing, Myers underinvestment story is 
not the only theoretical rationale for 
this practice.  (See Enforcement Con-
cerns May Affect Debt Maturity.)
Myers’s model also predicts that 
firms with larger growth opportuni-
ties should use more short-term debt. 
think of a fast-growing firm or one 
with substantial investments in r&D 
as examples of firms with significant 
growth opportunities.8 Although the 
literature is not unanimous, most 
studies support this prediction. Shane 
Johnson’s article is probably the most 
thorough empirical study so far. First, 
he finds that firms with larger growth 
opportunities take on less debt. 
Second, he finds that firms that use 
primarily short-term debt have higher 
debt loads than firms that use primar-
ily long-term debt. these findings are 
consistent with the idea that firms 
try to avoid underinvestment both by 
reducing their reliance on debt and by 
shortening the maturity of the debt 
they use.9
MARKET TIMING MAY AFFECT 
DEBT MATURITY
Managers Seem to Believe That 
They Can Time the Market.  the 
empirical literature has consistently 
found evidence suggesting that manag-
ers time their borrowings in the belief 
they can use their forecast of interest 
rate movements to lower their cost of 
funds. this is the third most common 
reason given by CFos in Graham and 
harvey’s survey.   Specifically, CFos 
say that they issue short-term debt 
when “short-tem rates are low com-
pared to long-term rates,” or when “we 
are waiting for long-term rates to come 
down.”  this is particularly important 
for large firms, which have relatively 
easy access to financial markets. other 
studies have consistently found that 
short-term borrowings are higher 
when the term spread—the difference 
between the 10-year and the one-year 
interest rate on treasury securities—is 
high, that is, when long-term rates are 
relatively high compared to short-term 
rates.10 Graham and harvey’s response 
    
7 the discerning reader may ask why stockhold-
ers and bondholders can’t strike some kind of 
deal to ensure that the profitable investment 
is made. Myers’s model assumes that there are 
impediments to renegotiating the terms of the 
debt. 
8 Most studies use the ratio of a firm’s market 
value to its book value as a measure of growth 
opportunities. the market value includes the 
firm’s outstanding stock measured at market 
prices and the value of its debt, while the book 
value is the original sale price of the stock plus 
the value of its debt. the idea behind using this 
ratio as a measure of growth opportunities is 
that the firm’s stock price will include investors’ 
valuation of future investments. Many studies 
also use the firm’s investment in r&D as an 
indicator of growth opportunities.
9 Johnson’s paper takes explicit account of both 
the firm’s choice of leverage and of the maturity 
of its debt as a means of resolving underinvest-
ment. this resolves some contradictory findings 
in the earlier contributions. 
10 these studies include those by barclay and 
Smith; Jose Guedes and tim opler; and Faulk-
ender and Petersen.  Business Review  Q1  2006   7 www.philadelphiafed.org
ENFORCEMENT CONCERNS MAY AFFECT DEBT MATURITY
o
liver hart and John Moore present a 
model of debt maturity in which the 
borrower can’t fully commit to a stream 
of future debt payments.  In particular, 
an entrepreneur can always threaten to 
walk away from her debts. Although she can be compelled 
to turn over the physical assets of the firm in the event 
of default, her accumulated skills and knowledge (her 
human capital) can’t be touched by her creditors.  thus, 
each debt payment potentially gives rise to bargaining 
between the lender and the borrower, in which the lender 
threatens to take the firm’s assets and the borrower 
answers that assets are worth less in the hands of another 
manager (so that  the lender would be shooting himself in 
the foot by carrying out the threat).
While this scenario may seem a little melodramatic 
as a description of a routine debt transaction, hart and 
Moore argue that, ultimately, the borrower’s threat 
to walk away and the lender’s threat to seize assets 
determine the feasibility of a particular stream of debt 
payments. If the debt maturity is too long term, i.e., 
if debt payments are postponed until too late in the 
productive life of the assets they finance, the borrower’s 
threat to walk away becomes a serious problem. In this 
case, the contract would be calling upon the borrower 
to make large repayments precisely when the lender’s 
threat to liquidate is weakest. When the remaining life 
of the assets is very short: (1) the borrower’s lost profits 
from losing control of the assets are small, so the costs of 
walking away are small;a (2) the value of the assets to the 
lender is small (because the assets have depreciated), so
the gains to the lender from seizing assets are small.  
At the same time, the firm’s debt can be too short 
term. Investments yield profits over time, and the firm’s 
accumulated cash flow from a project may be too small to 
cover large debt payments early on. one possibility is to 
use short-term debt that might be renegotiated if current 
cash flows are too small to cover promised payments. but 
efficient renegotiation may be impossible.  the problem is 
that even if future revenues are high enough to shift some 
payments into the future under a renegotiated agreement, 
the borrower has only limited ability to make credible 
commitments to make debt payments out of future 
revenues. So renegotiations would only lead to promises 
that would never be kept.b  
hart and Moore’s theoretical analysis includes two 
interesting empirical predictions. the first is that firms 
will match the maturity of their assets and their debts; 
thus, hart and Moore provide another explanation of 
this businessman’s maxim (borne out by Graham and 
harvey’s survey findings). As assets become longer lived, 
they provide the creditor with the security to wait longer 
before being repaid; the lender’s threat to seize assets 
is more credible when assets are longer lived. A second 
prediction is that more fungible assets — those that can 
be more readily used by another firm — can more readily 
support long-term debt. Again, the firm’s ability to com-
mit to making debt payments out of future revenues is 
enhanced by the strength of the lender’s threat to seize 
assets.  this prediction has recently found empirical sup-
port in a historical study of the U.S. railroads by efraim 
benmelech.
a of course, borrowers will also be concerned about their reputation and their access to future finance. 
    
b An implication of this line of reasoning is that the borrower’s inability to commit to forgo seeking to renegotiate the contract can lead to underin-
vestment (for reasons different from those emphasized by Myers). that is, some essentially profitable investments simply can’t be financed.  this will 
happen if the borrower has to borrow a large share of the initial investment, if the project yields cash flows too late in the life of the project, and if 
the project’s liquidation value is too low.8   Q1  2006 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
to their findings sums up research-
ers’ typically puzzled response: “[I]t is 
not clear to us why firms pursue this 
strategy” (p. 233).11 
Michael Faulkender’s article 
presents striking evidence that firms’ 
managers believe they can time their 
borrowings to reduce their cost of 
funds. he examines financing poli-
cies for firms in the chemical industry 
between 1994 and 1999.12  In particu-
lar, Faulkender examines these firms’ 
use of interest rate swaps undertaken 
jointly with their new borrowings. In 
the simplest interest rate swap, one 
party exchanges the interest pay-
ments on its own debt for the interest 
payments on another party’s debt. So 
a firm that pays a floating rate on its 
own debt can exchange these variable 
payments for another firm’s fixed inter-
est rate payments. 
When a firm increases its short-
term debt, it will end up paying 
higher interest costs if interest rates 
rise. Conversely, when it increases its 
long-term debt, it will be paying higher 
interest rates than those prevailing in 
the market if interest rates fall. this 
is called interest rate risk. When firms 
undertake a new borrowing they may 
take an accompanying swap position 
to offset, or hedge, their interest rate 
risk.  For example, a firm that takes on 
new floating rate debt will be hurt if 
interest rates rise. the firm can hedge 
this risk by exchanging the interest 
rate payments on its floating rate debt 
for fixed interest rate payments in 
the swap market.13 however, a CFo 
who firmly believes that he or she can 
forecast interest rates might not hedge 
against the risk of interest rates rising 
but might purchase a swap that ampli-
fies the firm’s exposure to rising rates. 
this behavior is called speculation.
Faulkender finds that the swaps 
undertaken in conjunction with new 
borrowings are not taken for hedging 
purposes. that is, a firm that takes on 
new floating rate debt is not typically 
swapping floating interest payments for 
fixed interest payments. In itself, this 
is surprising. Most academic observ-
ers have simply assumed that these 
swaps were undertaken to hedge the 
new debt.  Further, the likelihood that 
a firm takes a speculative position 
depends on the term premium. So a 
firm is not only more likely to borrow 
using floating rate debt when the term 
premium is high; it is also more likely 
to swap fixed interest payments for 
floating interest payments at the same 
time as the debt offering when the 
term premium is high.
  Most Economists Believe That 
CFOs Can’t Time the Market.  to 
a first approximation, the main factor 
affecting the relationship between 
short-term and long-term interest rates 
is investor expectations about future 
interest rates.  For example, accord-
ing to the expectations theory of the 
yield curve, the 10-year treasury rate 
is simply the average of investors’ 
expected one-year t-bill rates over the 
next 10 years. While it is plausible that 
corporate CFos might have private 
information about their firms’ financial 
condition — as in Diamond’s model 
— they are very unlikely to have supe-
rior information about future interest 
rate movements, and thus, they are 
not likely to produce systematically 
better interest rate forecasts than other 
market participants.14 If CFos don’t 
have superior forecasts, economic 
theory says that borrowing short term 
and refinancing should lead to the 
same (risk-adjusted) borrowing costs as 
borrowing long term.15
one way to see this is to imag-
ine that CFos could systematically 
reduce borrowing costs by borrowing 
short term when short-term rates are 
11 one theory of debt maturity by Ivan brick and 
Abraham ravid does predict that the term pre-
mium should affect firms’ optimal debt maturity 
through tax effects. but their model has been 
consistently rejected by the data, with the puz-
zling exception of Stohs and Mauer’s paper.  
12 Focusing on firms in a single industry is at-
tractive for two reasons. First, since firms in a 
single industry face similar operating environ-
ments, it is less likely that empirical findings are 
driven by unobserved differences between firms.   
Second, it is easier to find comparable measures 
for factors that researchers expect will affect 
firms’ borrowing policies, for example, factors 
affecting industry risk.
 
13 the reader may wonder why a firm would ever 
want to borrow short term using floating rate 
debt if it preferred a fixed interest rate (or vice 
versa). A number of explanations are possible.  
one is that the firm chooses its debt maturity 
to avoid underinvestment. While short-term 
debt might be attractive for this reason, a firm 
may not want to bear the additional interest 
rate risk.
  
14 I am simplifying here. Factors other than 
expectations affect the precise shape of the yield 
curve and the theory of the yield curve is a ven-
erable and continuing controversy in econom-
ics.   nonetheless, the main point still holds. 
there is little reason to imagine that corporate 
treasurers have systematically better informa-
tion than other market participants about other 
factors affecting the supply and demand for 
funds at different maturities.
15 Just to be clear, in this discussion I am not 
taking account of the issues considered by 
Diamond.  think about a world in which all 
information about a firm’s creditworthiness is 
public information.
The belief that CFOs can time the market 
is equivalent to the belief that sophisticated 
lenders are systematically taken to the 
cleaners by corporate CFOs.  Business Review  Q1  2006   9 www.philadelphiafed.org
unusually low and switching to long-
term rates when long-term rates are 
unusually low. this would mean that 
borrowers are systematically profiting 
at lenders’ expense. It should be kept 
in mind that these lenders are large 
banks, insurance companies, money 
market funds, and so forth. thus, the 
belief that CFos can time the market 
is equivalent to the belief that sophis-
ticated lenders — whose business is 
to make money by borrowing and lend-
ing — are systematically taken to the 
cleaners by corporate CFos.   
Why do CFos believe they can 
time the market?  one possibility is 
that CFos are simply wrong and that 
their firms’ cost of funds is not lowered 
by market timing.  Indeed, Graham 
and Campbell’s survey uncovers a 
number of capital budgeting and 
financing policies that are very com-
mon, yet don’t appear rational from the 
standpoint of a financial economist.  
Another possibility is that CFos are 
actually able to lower their cost of 
funds, but for reasons other than their 
ability to forecast interest rate move-
ments.  Perhaps managers have hit 
upon a rule of thumb that has actually 
worked, but not because CFos have 
better models of the yield curve.  
In their article, Malcolm baker, 
robin Greenwood, and Jeffrey Wurg-
ler, using U.S. data between 1953 and 
2000, present empirical evidence that 
large firms do indeed borrow short 
term when long-term borrowing would 
have been more expensive (and vice 
versa). the authors suggest that man-
agers may actually be able to exploit 
inefficiencies in debt markets to lower 
their borrowing costs, although they 
do not identify a particular type of 
market inefficiency that would explain 
this possibility.
Alexander butler, Gustavo Grul-
lon, and James Westen have argued 
that baker and coauthors’ results are 
flawed on econometric grounds.16 
Apart from these concerns, most econ-
omists will remain unconvinced about 
the profitability of market timing with-
out a plausible economic mechanism 
to explain corporate treasurers’ suc-
cess.  Ultimately, baker and coauthors’ 
main argument for taking the possibil-
ity of profitable market timing seriously 
is that corporate treasurers believe it 
is profitable. but essentially irrational 
practices can persist as long as the 
available data do not provide strong 
evidence that the practice is losing 
money.  the correlations unearthed 
by baker and coauthors suggest that 
during the postwar period, corporate 
treasurers could convince themselves 
that they were not losing money for 
their firms, even if their dreams of tim-
ing the market were delusory.
CONCLUSION
Financial economists have made 
significant progress in understanding 
firms’ debt maturity decisions. Sub-
stantial empirical evidence supports 
the view that firms’ private informa-
tion about their credit risk is an im-
portant determinant of debt maturity. 
In particular, the evidence is broadly 
consistent with a model in which firms 
balance two opposing factors. Short-
term debt makes borrowing costs more 
sensitive to public information but may 
force a firm to borrow at an inop-
portune time. Substantial evidence 
also supports the view that firms with 
significant growth opportunities will 
choose the maturity of their debt to 
avoid debt overhang, which can lead 
the firm to forgo profitable invest-
ments.
While it is not the business of 
economists to slavishly produce models 
that reinforce businessmen’s prejudices, 
both views find support in survey re-
sponses by CFos, who state that they 
choose debt maturity to match the ma-
turity of their assets and liabilities and 
that their borrowing choice reflects 
their desire to avoid having to borrow 
at an inopportune time. CFos’ own 
statements provide financial econo-
mists with some comfort that they are 
not theorizing about debt maturity in 
a vacuum.
While the theories seem to have 
been successful in explaining the bor-
rowing choices of large firms, financial 
economists have made less headway in 
understanding maturity decisions for 
smaller firms. 
however, CFos also state that 
their debt maturity choices are partly 
driven by the desire to borrow short 
term when short-term rates are unusu-
ally low or to lock in a long-term rate 
when they believe long-term rates are 
likely to rise.  there is also substantial 
empirical evidence that firms’ financ-
ing decisions do, in fact, reflect this 
motive. here, there is less comfort for 
economists because economic models 
do not support the idea that firms can 
systematically reduce borrowing costs 
this way.
While economists are often 
puzzled and challenged to explain busi-
ness practices — is the practice simply 
irrational, or is there some logic to it? 
— CFos’ belief that they can reduce 
borrowing costs by timing the matu-
rity of their borrowings is even more 
puzzling, because there is some recent 
evidence that such timing may actually 
work.  Unsurprisingly, this evidence 
has been forcefully challenged and 
remains an open area for research. 
16 butler, Grullon, and Westen’s article makes 
a convincing argument that the empirical 
patterns in baker et al. are spuriously driven by 
structural shifts during the 1980s.  In particular, 
they argue that both excess returns and firms’ 
debt maturity policies changed in response to 
changes in monetary and fiscal policy in the 
1980s, leading to a spurious correlation in baker 
et al.’s data.      B R10   Q1  2006 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
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